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Abstract 
The ownership structure in a firm is considered as crucial instrument for alleviating agency 
problems (Sun, Ding, Guo, and Li, 2017). The wider the ownership, the longer decision 
might be taken. The purposes of this study are to analyze the effect of ownership structure, 
namely managerial ownership and institutional ownership, stock market liquidity, and 
profitability on financial leverage. This research was conducted for 4 years from the period 
of 2014 to 2018. This study used 14 companies as samples. Based on the results of research 
and data analysis it is shown that: (1) Managerial Share Ownership has a negative effect on 
financial leverage, (2) Profitability (MSO) has a negative effect on financial leverage, (3) 
Share Turnover (MSO) has no effect on financial leverage, (4) IO has a negative effect on 
financial leverage, (5) Profitability (IO) has a positive effect on financial leverage, (6) Share 
Turnover (IO) has no effect on financial leverage. The implications of the results above are 
as follows: theoretically, this research provides insight into the implementation of agency 
theory in funding decisions. Because this research was carried out in manufacturing 
companies listed in LQ45, highlight the generalization of theories in all contexts, especially 
in developing countries such as Indonesia. At a practical level, this result can be used by 
investors, fund managers as a reference in making funding decisions, whether to prioritize 
internal or external funding. 
Keywords: Ownership Structure, Financial Leverage, Profitability, And Stock Market 
Liquidity 
INTRODUCTION 
Agency theory is a well-known theory in corporate finance. The theory explains how a 
principal assigns specific responsibility to an agent. When the needs of the principle and the agent 
coincide, an "agency problem" occurs, with the agent's interests gaining precedence over the 
principals. The agency problem is a frequent occurrence in businesses. The ownership structure 
is a component of corporate governance, which aims to balance shareholders' interests and 
minimize agency costs. The ownership structure of a firm is made up of a variety of entities, 
including corporations, institutions, and managers. There are two types of share ownership: 
managerial and institutional. Despite emerging evidence in the financial literature that agency 
conflicts in ownership structures have an effect on firm performance (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny 
1988; Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb 2003), few studies have explored how ownership structure 
affects a firm's capital structure when agency conflicts are considered.  
Additionally, the relationship between management ownership and finance decision in the 
USA and China has been studied extensively (Hayat and Jebran, 2018). A non-linear relationship 
between management share ownership and external funding was argued by these researchers. 
Similarly, institutional ownership and debt were positively correlated in the USA but negatively 
correlated in China. A study conducted in the United Kingdom found a positive correlation 
between institutional ownership (IO) and a firm's leverage level. Stock issuance increased over 
bonds, reducing MSO's leverage (Sun et al, 2015). This is one of the first efforts to define the 
relationship in developing economies, specifically Indonesia, as the majority of previous research 
in similar frameworks has been conducted in emerging economies. Emerging economies' capital 
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markets are less liquid than developed economies', contributing to higher volatility and slower 
growth. Additionally, these markets have limited capital access, slow financial market expansion, 
and limited institutional ownership (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). 
In MSO, the manager has the authority to increase the company's borrowing in order to 
invest it, with the goal of increasing the company's future profits. The company's return on equity 
(ROE) will improve as a result of the higher investments, which would eventually result in an 
increase in manager bonuses and income. As a result, the researchers believe that MSO has a 
tendency to expand borrowing. Institutional shareholders own a substantial portion of the stock, 
which implies it possess greater incentives and voting power when it comes to deciding financial 
policies. Numerous studies conducted from a managerial perspective indicate that the funding 
decisions of companies are heavily influenced by their managers' objectives, desires, behavior, 
and preferences (e.g., Grossman & Hart,1980; Jensen,1986; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Zwiebel, 1996; 
Brailsford et al., 2002; Pindado and De La Torre, 2011). In addition, market valuation interplays 
with ownership structure in determining leverage levels and external financing policies. Pedersen 
and Thomsen (2000) consider stock market valuation a probable determinant of firm ownership 
structure. Multiple types of research have been done regarding the relationship between equity 
liquidity and stock returns (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003), share price information quality (Fang 
et al., 2009), capital costs (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Chang et 
al., 2010), and also firm value (Butler et al., 2005; Frieder and Martell, 2006; Lipson and Mortal, 
2009; Udomsirikul et al., 2011). The purpose of this research is to determine how MSO affects 
the financial leverage of the organization. The second objective is to determine how institutional 
shareholders affect the financial leverage of the firm. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Agency Theory 
The agency relationship arises when one or more persons employ an agent to provide a 
service and delegate decision-making authority to the agents (Jensen and Meckling 1976: 57). 
Owners or shareholders appoint a manager to manage their firm. The authority granted by the 
shareholders to the manager to handle the firm's finances may be abused to benefit the manager 
rather than the shareholders. Asymmetric information occurred in this scenario. As opposed to 
the shareholders, the manager has a more profound grasp and understanding of the company's 
position and prospects. Generally, the manager must inform the shareholders of the company's 
status. The information asymmetry increases the likelihood of managers organizing the report to 
suit their interests, lowering its credibility. The sequence's aftermath causes agency conflict. 
According to Bringham and Houston (2006), managers have more decision-making power than 
stockholders, leading to a conflict of interest for both sides, termed agency conflict. Agency 
conflict can be mitigated by establishing a monitoring mechanism that aligns managers' and 
shareholders' interests; this technique is known as agency cost. Two options exist to reduce 
agency costs: institutional ownership (IO) and managerial share ownership (MSO).  
Signaling Theory 
Signaling theory implies that decisions on capital structures are used to transmit personal 
knowledge on the company’s potential earnings when asymmetry occurs between managers and 
investors. Asymmetric information propels managers to use leverage and dividends to signal 
private information about the company’s performance and potential earnings of the firm (Miller 
and Rock, 1985). 
Pecking Order Theory  
Pecking order theory states that companies are inclined to finance their investment 
depending on their internal financial sources when asymmetric information occurs. Moreover, if 
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it is inadequate, companies will seek external financing. In addition, when adverse selection 
problems emerge as an effect of asymmetric information on the capital markets, companies will 
rely first on their retained earnings, then on debt financing, and lastly on their equity to fund new 
investments (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Market Timing Theory 
The market timing theory argues that companies control the timing when they are issuing 
equity. The new stock will be issued when the price is overvalued, and buy its shares when it is 
undervalued. In addition, fluctuations in the stock prices will influence capital structures 
(Visinescu et al., 2009). 
Financial Leverage 
Leverage occurs when a company's assets are financed with debt or preferred stock, causing 
fluctuations in shareholder income. Financial leverage, like operating leverage, can raise returns 
but also risk. The relationship between operational profits and earnings per share is associated 
with financial leverage. While the leverage ratio is one of numerous financial metrics that 
examines how much capital is borrowed (loans). It assesses a company's financial stability. The 
leverage ratio is significant because companies utilize a mix of stock and debt to fund their 
operations. Understanding how much debt a company has helps determine whether it can pay 
its debts on time. 
Highly leveraged corporations have more volatile shareholder returns than those with less 
debt. Financial leverage is generally measured by the interest payments to operating profit ratio. 
Because corporations must consistently pay interest and principal on debt as part of their 
contract with lenders, but they do not have to pay preferred stock dividends if their earnings are 
low, debt financing is the riskiest option for shareholders (Trygve Haavelmo, A Study in the Theory 
of Investment, 1960: p.3) 
External Financing 
External financing is a concept that describes funds obtained by businesses from sources 
other than internal sources. On the other hand, internal funding is in opposition to external 
financing, which is mainly comprised of profits retained by the company for investment. External 
funding is often considered more expensive than internal financing, as the firm is frequently 
required to pay a transaction cost to receive it. Proper ownership structure management can 
have a significant impact on company leverage levels, reiterating the arguments of Brailsford, 
Oliver, and Pua (2002), Florackis and Ozkan (2009), and Friend and Lang (1988). 
Institutional Ownership 
Institutional ownership is the proportion of available stock in a corporation possessed by 
mutual or pension funds, insurance companies, investment firms, private foundations, 
endowments, or other significant entities that manage assets on behalf of others. According to 
the active monitoring theory, institutional investors can help to decrease managerial moral 
hazard by constantly monitoring corporate performance (Jensen, 1986; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
The benefits of cash flow monitoring compel external investors to cover the expenditures. In 
comparison to individual investors, institutional investors can oversee management more 
effectively because they have access to various sources of information and a significant 
investment in a company. A high degree of institutional ownership ensures that management will 
stick to company strategies in the shareholders' best interests (Barclay & Warner, 1993; 
Grossman & Hart, 1980). 
Managerial Share Ownership 
MSO is established to incentivize Executives to accumulate and hold a significant amount of 
common stock in the Company. A capital structure is adopted by entrenched managers who trade 
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off empire-building ambitions with the necessity for efficiency and control. A takeover is avoided 
when managers willingly issue debt to limit their liability and avoid unproductive investment. 
Thus, issuing debt implies a firm's commitment to operating improvements and ability to repay 
debt (Leland&Pyle,1977). 
A significant number of studies demonstrate that managers' goals, ambitions, and 
preferences strongly impact business financing decisions (e.g., Grossman & Hart,1980; 
Jensen,1986; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Zwiebel, 1996). Jensen (1986) argues that managerial moral 
hazard affects capital structure decisions. Managers may undertake projects with a negative net 
present value (NPV) to pursue growth, particularly if the firm has a considerable amount of free 
cash flow remaining after funding all positive-NPV projects. Debt commitments can diminish free 
cash available for managers' wealth (Grossman & Hart, 1980). Nonetheless, managers may avoid 
debt to preserve managerial opportunism, consistent with actual findings showing that 
organizations with greater management control utilize less debt (Berger et al., 1997). Thus, risk-
averse managers are less willing to increase company debt levels to protect undiversified human 
capital. 
 
Stock Market Liquidity 
Stock market liquidity is a fundamental influence of the cost of raising capital. Consequently, 
security prices decrease just before issuance as investors are cautious about the information 
asymmetry problem (Myers, 1984). The infinite liquid stock has interested buyers and sellers 
willing to trade at any price. Thus, management can limit price impact by issuing stocks when 
liquidity is high (Baker and Stein, 2004). According to Weston, Butler, and Grullon (2005), high 
liquidity stocks lower issuance costs. Studies have shown that substantial stock liquidity affects a 
company's capital structure since management raises funds by issuing equity over bonds. Baker 
and Wurgler (2002) propose that enterprises raise external capital when the cost of equity is 
temporarily low and that prior equity issues have a lasting effect on leverage. According to Welch 
(2004), stock price fluctuation is one of the critical factors of capital structure changes. In a hot 
market, a company's stock price may be inflated due to increased investor demand. Due to equity 
issues and share transactions, this automatically reduces debt levels. Pedersen and Thomsen 
(2000) believe the stock market valuation influences corporate ownership structure. 
Profitability 
Profitability is a parameter that can influence a firm's value. Profitability is the income 
generated by sales (Astuti 2004:36). According to Ross (1977), management uses debt to attract 
outsiders to the firm's performance. Firms with high projected financial performance may have 
greater ROA, therefore employing "total assets" should be more efficient. Additionally, ROA can 
capture the marginal efficiency of additional borrowings, whereas ROE is unable to do so. The 
researchers must reevaluate the drivers of capital structure throughout time as institutional 
arrangements change (Frank and Goyal, 2009). Profitability is a key factor in determining 
leverage. According to the pecking order theory, profitable companies use internal financing to 
fund future projects. 
In contrast, firms with a low-profit rate prefer to use external financing due to their low 
retained earnings and profits (Myers & Majluf, 1984). The empirical evidence appears to 
contradict the theories mentioned above' predictions. Several studies have yielded data that 
support the pecking-order theory (Lemmon, Roberts & Zender,2008; Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 
1999). However, other research shows the opposite (Chirinko & Singha, 2000; Leary & Roberts, 
2010). Because several studies produced different results, the researcher decided to include 
profitability in the investigation (ROA). 
Hypothesis 
According to two conflicting theories, interest alignment theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
and managerial entrenchment theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983), several findings discover a 
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curvilinear relationship between MSO and leverage (e.g., Brailsford et al., 2002; Florackis & Ozkan, 
2009). Managers employ debt financing to offset the agency cost of free cash flow in this situation 
(Jensen, 1986), thereby regaining control (Zwiebel, 1996). When MSO reaches a "changeover" 
point, managers can adjust debt levels to their benefit (Brailsford et al., 2002). Entrenched 
managers have more incentive to limit corporate debt levels, avoid interest payment obligations, 
and reduce the danger of bankruptcy and loss of entrenchment (Jensen, 1986; Zwiebel, 1996). 
Managers who have no ownership share in the company are more likely to incur additional debt 
to boost the firm's value (Grossman and Hart, 1982). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
debt diminishes management's controllable free cash flow. Managers ensure timely interest 
payments and minimize resource usage for personal gain. 
Additionally, Grossman & Hart (1982) argued that managers use debt to finance their 
operations for three reasons. First, if managers own profit sharing or stock options, these will 
incentivize them, as profit sharing and stock options are tied to the firm's value. Second, the 
company charter may permit or even require the firm to assume control. In this situation, 
undervalued enterprises make for easy takeover targets. The manager's interest is to preserve or 
increase the firm's value and avert any prospective takeover. Third, if management relies entirely 
on stock to finance their operations, potential investors are red flags. 
Debt financing demonstrates management's commitment to profit maximization for the 
investor, even if debt limits managerial discretion. Thus, management has a greater proclivity to 
use more debt in order to attract additional investment. Increased investment indicates that 
managers will consume more perquisites. We anticipate a substantial correlation between 
managerial ownership and the choice between stock and bonds, based on the underlying agency 
theory and survey evidence to date (e.g., Bayless & Chaplinsky, 1996; Berger et al., 1997). 
According to Myers and Majluf's (1984) adverse selection model, managers prefer bond issuance 
over equity issues to mitigate the underfunding problem. This issue arises due to information 
asymmetry, in which current shareholders are better educated about a firm's value than 
prospective investors are. Assuming management acts in the best interests of existing 
shareholders, they will only issue stock to finance a new project if the firm lacks sufficient internal 
cash or hazardous growth prospects. As a result, the market undervalues additional shares. 
Firms will reject even initiatives with a positive net present value if the cost of new capital is 
greater than the project's value. This underinvestment can be mitigated by funding the project 
through a less susceptible mechanism to market price movements. As a result, managers will 
prioritize internal funds first, followed by debt issues, and last by equity offerings, as pecking order 
theory suggests (Myers & Majluf,1984). Nonetheless, contemporary managers, according to 
numerous conjectures, have a proclivity towards stock issuance. To begin with, regularly paying 
interest on debt minimizes the likelihood of management overinvestment (Jensen, 1986). 
Second, managers are averse to supervision by external debt creditors (Zwiebel, 1996). Third, 
excessive debt levels are associated with an increased likelihood of financial distress and 
bankruptcy. Managers have a non-diversifiable employment risk since their firm's survival, 
bankruptcy, or financial crisis may result in job loss or demotion (Brailsford et al., 2002; Friend & 
Lang, 1988). In other words, when the risk of losing control is lower, corporations are more willing 
to fund advancement through share issuance. The following hypothesis is proposed. 
H1: Managerial ownership has a negative impact on the leverage of a company. 
Management uses debt to indicate how well the organization is performing to outsiders 
(Ross, 1977). Firms with high projected financial performance may have greater ROA, therefore 
employing "total assets" should be more efficient. It also captures the marginal efficiency of 
further borrowings where ROE fails. On the other hand, institutional ownership sends a positive 
signal to prospective investors. Institutional investors direct management, discipline it and 
improve the firm's value. Institutional investors can help alleviate the managerial moral hazard 
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problem (Jensen, 1986; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Empirical evidence shows that IO has better 
incentives to maximize business value and longevity. 
According to Hayar M and Jebran K (2018), institutional shareholders have a more diverse 
portfolio than managers and other shareholders. Direct monitoring of each investment in the 
portfolio would thereby increase the overall monitoring cost. So, institutional shareholders are 
more inclined to use debt as a monitoring mechanism rather than direct monitoring. In terms of 
signalling theory, institutional ownership benefits creditors by reducing managerial discretion and 
debt costs. 
H2: Institutional ownership has a negative impact on the leverage of firms. 
Frieder and Martell (2006) observed that high leverage reduces agency costs and increases 
equity liquidity. Additionally, they discovered that leverage increases as liquidity declines due to 
a high transaction cost for equity financing. Moreover, high stock liquidity reduces equity cost, 
increasing reliance on equity financing and decreasing firm leverage (Lipson and Mortal, 2009). 
Another study in emerging markets indicated a negative relationship between stock liquidity and 
financial leverage (Udomsirikul et al., 2011). This implies that firms with a high level of liquid 
equity are unusually low leveraged, implying that stock liquidity is a crucial factor in emerging and 
developed economies' capital structures. Since emerging economies have distinct characteristics, 
various elements influence capital structure decisions in India (Sharma and Paul,2015). There is 
ongoing debate concerning the relationship between leverage and stock liquidity in emerging 
economies. 
Companies in emerging countries suffer from a high degree of information asymmetry and 
low stock liquidity. It shows the difficulty of raising both equity and debt financing. Asymmetric 
information demonstrates inconsistency, stock illiquidity, and adverse selection, all of which 
negatively impact a firm's creditworthiness and access to debt markets. As a result, companies 
with restricted access to public bond markets have lower leverage ratios (Faulkender and 
Petersen,2016). Firms with limited liquidity will be unable to access debt financing in emerging 
markets countries. 
H3: Stock market liquidity has a positive impact on financial leverage. 
According to the pecking-order theory, profitable businesses utilize less debt financing 
because they can accrue significant sums of retained earnings. Profitable organizations tend to 
employ internal finance for future projects, while less profitable enterprises choose external 
financing due to low retained revenues and profits (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Empirical evidence 
appears to indicate a range of outcomes consistent with the expectations of the theories as 
mentioned earlier. Numerous investigations have produced findings that support the pecking-
order theory's predictions (Lemmon, Roberts & Zender,2008; Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999). 
However, several investigations have proven the contrary (Chirinko & Singha, 2000; Leary & 
Roberts, 2010). Thus, the researcher anticipates that, given a stable economic environment, 
profitability, or in this case, return on asset, will affect financial leverage. We shall test the 
following hypothesis: 
H4: Return on assets has a negative effect on financial leverage. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA ANALYSIS 
Penelitian ini menggunakan jenis penelitian survey terhadap karyawan PT. Mandiri Utama 
This study employs a hypothetico-deductive approach. hypothetico-deductive reasoning derives 
conclusions from logical analysis (Sekaran, 2003) and an empirical study on manufacturing 
enterprises classified as LQ45 and listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The research aims to 
examine the effect of ownership structure and stock market liquidity on manufacturing firms' 
leverage and financing decisions classified as LQ45 and listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. 
The sample for this study is manufacturing firms classified as LQ45 that are publicly traded on the 
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Indonesian Stock Exchange. Purposive sampling was utilized in this study. A purposive sampling 
method is designed on specific criteria and considerations (Sugiyono, 2013). The criteria used in 
this research are as follows: a. Manufacturing companies included in LQ45 and listed in Indonesia 
Stock Exchange. b. Manufacturing companies that have published their financial report for more 
than five years. 
 Two methods were used in this research those are literature study method and the 
documentation method. The literature study method is gathered by analyzing varieties of 
literature, references, and theoretical basis correlated with the study. Documentation method 
collected by obtaining secondary data in the form of financial performance report, data panel in 
2014-2019. The panel data regression model is used in this research. Panel data consists of 
observations from the same cross-section or unit across a period (Gujarati, 1993). When the topic 
(time series, cross-section, or unit) is the same quantity, the observation is balanced. When each 
subject has a different amount, the panel is unbalanced. Panel data are classified into two types: 
short panel and long panel. When the cross-sectional area (N) is greater than the period (T), the 
panel data meets the criteria for a short panel. Moreover, if the amount of N is less than T, this is 
referred to as a long panel. Regression equation model in this study is: 
LEVit= β1 +β2 LIQUDITYit+β3MSOit+β4IOit+β5Liqit+uit……………………………………………………………………..(1) 
Where: 
i = unit cross section (Manufacturing firms LQ45) 
t = unit time series (year) 
u = residual value 
LEV = firms’ leverage 
LIQUIDITY = stock market liquidity 
MSO = managerial share ownership 
IO = institutional ownership 
Panel data are frequently used in the study of finance to observe companies across time. 
Unobserved firm effects are particularly prevalent in studies on corporate finance decisions, 
where regression residuals can be related across firms and years. If the residuals are independent 
and uniformly distributed, the standard errors in Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression are 
unbiased (Petersen, 2009). As a result, the technique used in this study is OLS. 
OLS (Ordinary Least Square) Pooled Model 
An assumption applies in this research is that all manufacturing firms in LQ45 have the same 
coefficient regression. Thus, the OLS equation in this study is as follow:  
LEVit= β1 +β2 LIQUDITYit+β3MSOit+β4IOit+β5Liqit+uit…………………………………………………………………… (2) 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
In this study, the researcher looked at manufacturing companies that were listed on the 
Indonesia stock exchange (IDX) and classified as LQ45 enterprises. The researcher analyzed data 
from the years 2014 to 2018. This research aims to determine whether and to what extent agency 
conflicts in ownership structure affect firm leverage ratios and external financing decisions by 
selecting companies that meet the criteria of MSO and IO. According to IDX statistics, 45 
enterprises meet the LQ45 criteria. The researcher identified 14 manufacturing companies by 
purposive sampling. The following is a list of companies: 
 
Table 1 List of Companies 
NO CODE NAME OF COMPANIES 
1 ASII Astra International Tbk 
2 SMGR Semen Indonesia (Persero) Tbk 
3 GGRM Gudang Garam Tbk 
4 BRPT Barito Pacific Tbk 
5 INDF Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk 
                     Motif Dan Kepuasan Penggunaan… 
 
 
                                                                           Performance. Volume 28 Nomor 2 Tahun 2021, 28-39 
35 
6 TPIA PT Chandra Asri Petrochemical Tbk 
7 CPIN Charoen Pokphand Indonesia Tbk 
8 HMSP HM Sampoerna Tbk 
9 INKP Indah Kiat Pulp & Paper Tbk 
10 ICBP Indofood CBP Sukses Makmur Tbk 
11 INTP Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa Tbk 
12 KLBF Kalbe Farma Tbk 
13 SRIL PT Sri Rejeki Isman Tbk 
14 UNVR Unilever Indonesia Tbk 
 
Classical Assumption and Normality Test 
Managerial Share Ownership 
The model is categorized to be normally distributed if the graph is forming a bell-shaped. 
However, this assessment raises subjectivity, and therefore, another way to look at it is the value 
of probability. The model is said to be normally distributed if the probability value is> 0.05. In this 
case, the model has a probability value of 0.245705> 0.05. 
Institutional Ownership 
The model is assumed to be normally distributed if the graph is bell-shaped. However, this 
assessment raises subjectivity, and therefore another way to look at it is the value of probability. 
The model is said to be normally distributed if the probability value is> 0.05. In this case, the 
model has a probability value of 0.286409> 0.05. 
 
Descriptive Analysis 
Managerial Share Ownership 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
ROA 35 -0.0600 16.4600 7.8034 4.0708 
Share Turnover 35 0.0003 0.7557 0.1484 0.1501 
MSO (%) 35 0.0000 0.1394 0.0280 0.0392 
DER 35 0.3700 1.6100 0.8183 0.2645 
Valid N (listwise) 35         
 
Based on Table 2, the first variable is Return on Asset (ROA) (X4). The total number of 
samples is 35, and the minimum value answer is -0.0600, with the maximum value being 16.4600. 
The mean value of the X4 variable is 7.8034, with the value of the standard deviation being 
4.0708. It means that the mean value is greater than the standard deviation value, indicating that 
the X3 variable is good. Share Turnover (X3) that can be seen N of total respondents are 35, and 
the minimum value answers are 0.0003, for the answer to the highest value are 0.7557. The mean 
is obtained with a total value of 0.1484 with a standard deviation of 0.1501. It means that the 
mean value is lower than the standard deviation. The test results indicate that standard deviation 
reflects low deviations, so the data distribution shows a typical result.  
In variable MSO (X1) that can be seen, N of total respondents is 35, and the minimum value 
is 0.000, for the maximum value answers are 0.1394. The mean is obtained with a total value of 
0.280 with a standard deviation of 0.0392. It means that the mean value is lower than the 
standard deviation. The test results indicate that standard deviation has a low reflection from the 
standard deviations, so the data distribution is normal. In Table 2, that can be seen N of total 
respondents are 35, the minimum values for the variable Deb to Equity (DER)(Y) are 0.3700, and 
for the highest value, answers are 1.6100. The mean or the average value of this variable is 
0.8183, with a standard deviation value are 0.2645. It means that the mean value is greater than 
the standard deviation. It indicates that the Y variable is good. The results of the test indicate that 
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standard deviation has a low reflection to the deviations, so the data distribution shows a normal 
result. 
Institutional Ownership 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
DER 35 0.150 2.650 0.991 0.817 
ROA 35 1.940 46.660 17.043 12.669 
Share Turnover 35 0.000 2.054 0.238 0.522 
IO % 35 56.070 99.880 92.332 12.764 
Valid N (listwise) 35         
 
Based on Table 3, the first variable is DER (Y). The total number of samples is 35, and the 
minimum value answer is 0.150, with the maximum value being 2.650. The mean value of the Y 
variable is 0.991, with the value of the standard deviation being 0.817. It means that the mean 
value is greater than the standard deviation value, indicating that the Y variable is good. ROA (X4) 
that can be seen N of total respondents are 35, and the minimum value answers are 1.940, for 
the answer to the highest value are 46.660. The mean is obtained with a total value of 17.043 
with a standard deviation of 12.669. It means that the mean value is greater than the standard 
deviation. It implies that X4 variable is good. The test results indicate that standard deviation 
reflects low deviations, so the data distribution shows a typical result.  
In variable Share Turnover (X3) that can be seen, N of total respondents is 35, and the 
minimum value is 0.000, for the maximum value answers are 2.054. The mean is obtained with a 
total value of 0.238 with a standard deviation of 0.522. It means that the mean value is lower 
than the standard deviation. The test results indicate that standard deviation has a low reflection 
from the standard deviations, so the data distribution is normal. In Table 2, that can be seen N of 
total respondents are 35, the minimum values for the variable IO (X2) are 56.070, and for the 
highest value, answers are 99.880. The mean or the average value of this variable is 92.332, with 
a standard deviation value are 12.764. It means that the mean value is greater than the standard 
deviation. It indicates that the X1 variable is good. The results of the test indicate that standard 
deviation has a low reflection to the deviations, so the data distribution shows a normal result. 
T-Test Analysis 
Managerial Share Ownership 








1 Profitability has an influence 
financial leverage 
0.0000 -6.214167 Negatively 
influence 
Accepted 
2 Share turnover has an influence 
on leverage 
0.7966 0.260511 Has no 
influence 
Rejected 
3 Managerial share ownership has 
an influence on financial 
leverage  
0.0011 -3.695910 Negatively 
influence 
Accepted 
Notes: The positive and negative values on t statistics do not indicate whether the size of the 
value is big or small. it indicates the direction of its influence. 
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Institutional Ownership 








1 Profitability has an influence 
on financial leverage 
0.0095 2.764215 Positively 
influence 
Accepted 
2 Share turnover has an 
influence on leverage 
0.9396 -0.076356 No influence Rejected 
3 Institutional Ownership has 
an influence financial 
leverage  




Many studies show that managers' objectives, desires, behaviors, and preferences strongly 
impact the firms' financing decisions (e.g., Grossman & Hart,1980; Jensen,1986; Myers & Majluf, 
1984; Zwiebel, 1996; Brailsford et al., 2002; Pindado and De La Torre, 2011). Numerous tests have 
been conducted utilizing data from companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX). 
Specifically, LQ45 manufacturing companies. The value of Tstatistic is -3.695910 2.0301 (T-table), 
indicating that MSO affects financial leverage. In this scenario, MSO reduces financial leverage. 
As a result of this, the hypothesis is accepted. 
Institutional investors supervise and discipline management directly and contribute to the 
firm's value growth. Institutional investors can reduce managerial risk by regularly monitoring 
corporate performance (Jensen, 1986; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). According to Hayar M and Jebran 
K (2018), institutional shareholders have a more diverse portfolio than managers and other 
shareholders. In terms of signaling theory, institutional ownership benefits creditors by reducing 
managerial discretion and debt costs. Based on the initial empirical investigations, the researcher 
hypothesized that IO affects financial leverage. T-test result indicates T-statistic -2.917 2.0301 (T-
table), supporting the hypothesis that IO influences financial leverage. It has a negative effect on 
financial leverage. 
Frieder and Martell (2006) found that high transaction costs for equity financing increase 
leverage when liquidity decreases. Additionally, another study discovered that higher stock 
liquidity reduces costs of equity, increasing the reliance on equity financing and decreasing 
corporate leverage (Lipson and Mortal, 2009). The T-test results indicate that both MSO and IO 
companies' stock market liquidity does not affect financial leverage. The MSO t-statistic is 0.2605 
(t-table) while the IO t-statistic is -0.0763 (t-table). In this scenario, the hypothesis rejects. The 
researcher supports Elbannan's (2017) argument that developing countries have unique market 
conditions and that country and institutional factor may influence firm-specific variables. 
Indirectly, each emerging country may have various capital structure factors. 
Based on the pecking order theory, under the assumption of stable economic condition, 
profitability, the researcher generated a hypothesis that says the return on asset influences 
financial leverage. The result of the T-test for return on assets of MSO companies on financial 
leverage shows that t-statistic is -6.2141 < 2.0301 (t-table). This implies that the return on assets 
of MSO companies is negatively influencing financial leverage. For IO companies, the t-statistic is 
2.764 > 2.0301 (t-table), which indicates that the return on assets of IO companies is positively 
influencing financial leverage. Therefore, the hypothesis is supported. 
CONCLUSION 
After performing thorough analysis to unveil the impact of ownership structure on 
companies’ financial leverage and financial decision: evidence from Indonesia, the following 
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results emerged: Managerial Share Ownership has a negative effect on financial 
leverage, Profitability (MSO) has a negative effect on financial leverage, Share Turnover (MSO) 
has no effect on financial leverage, IO has a negative effect on financial leverage, Profitability (IO) 
has a positive effect on financial leverage, Share Turnover (IO) has no effect on financial leverage. 
Theoretically, this study provides insight into the implementation of agency theory in 
funding decisions. As the study was carried in the manufacturing firms listed in LQ45, it highlights 
the generalizability of the theory across contexts, especially in emerging countries like Indonesia. 
At the practical level, this can be used by investors and fund managers as references in making a 
funding decision, whether to prioritize internal or external funding. 
REFERENCES 
Astuti, D. (2004). Manajemen Keuangan Perusahaan. Cetakan Pertama. Jakarta: Ghalia Indonesia. 
Barclay, M. J., & Warner, J. B. (1993). Stealth trading and volatility. Journal of Financial Economics, 
34(3), 281–305. doi: 10.1016/0304-405x(93)90029-b 
Berk, J., & DeMarzo, P. (2017). Corporate Finance (4th ed.). Harlow: Pearson. 
Chirinko, R. S., & Singha, A. R. (2000). Testing static tradeoff against pecking order models of 
capital structure: A critical comment. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(3), 417e425.  
Elbannan, Mona A. Stock Market Liquidity, Family Ownership, and Capital Structure Choices in an 
Emerging Country. Emerging Markets Review, vol. 33, 2017, pp. 201–231., 
doi:10.1016/j.ememar.2017.11.001. 
Frank, M. Z., & Goyal, V. K. (2009). Capital structure decisions: Which factors are reliably 
important? Financial Management, 38(1), 1e37. 
Gillan, S., Hartzell, J., Parrino, R., (2009). Explicit vs. implicit contracts: evidence from CEO 
employment agreements. J. Finance 64, 1629–1655. 
Hale, R., Tse, M., Henken, D., Piaquaid, J., Elchoness, D., Minifie, S., (2000) Attracting and 
Retaining Key Employees While Protecting Your Business. Goodwin Proctor & Hoar LLP, 
Boston, MA. 
Ball, R. E., & Haavelmo, T. (1961). A Study in the Theory of Investment. The Journal of Finance, 
16(3), 455. doi: 10.2307/2977351 
Hayat, M., Yu, Y., Wang, M., & Jebran, K. (2018). Impact of Managerial and Institutional Ownership 
on Capital Structure: A Comparison Between China & USA. European Journal of Business and 
Management, 10, 69-79. Retrieved March 21, 2019, from 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328990396. 
Jensen, M., Meckling, W., (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. J. Financ. Econ. 3, 305–360. 
Jensen, M., Murphy, K., (1990). Performance pay and top management incentives. J. Polit. Econ. 
98, 225–265. 
Leary, M. T., & Roberts, M. R. (2010). The pecking order, debt capacity, and information 
asymmetry. Journal of Financial Economics, 95(3), 332e355. 
Lee, C., & Kuo, N. (2014). Effects of ultimate ownership structure and corporate tax on capital 
structures: Evidence from Taiwan. International Review of Economics & Finance, 29, 409-
425. doi:10.1016/j.iref.2013.07.004 
Lemmon, M. L., Roberts, M. R., & Zender, J. F. (2008). Back to the beginning: Persistence and the 
cross-section of corporate capital structure. The Journal of Finance, 63(4), 1575e1608. 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1986). Management Ownership and Corporate Performance: 
An Empirical Analysis. doi: 10.3386/w2055 
P.N. Sindhuja, Performance and Value Creation: Family Managed Business Versus Non-Family 
Managed Business. Journal of Business Strategy, Volume VI(3), (2009), 66-80. 
Sartono, Agus. 2010. Manajemen Keuangan Teori dan Aplikasi. Edisi 4. Yogyakarta: BPFE 
Shyam-Sunder, L., & Myers, S. C. (1999). Testing static tradeoff against pecking order models of 
capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(2), 219e244.  
                     Motif Dan Kepuasan Penggunaan… 
 
 
                                                                           Performance. Volume 28 Nomor 2 Tahun 2021, 28-39 
39 
Suliyanto. 2011. Ekonometrika Terapan: Teori & Aplikasi dengan SPSS. Andi. Yogyakarta. 
Sun, J., Ding, L., Guo, J. M., & Li, Y. (2016). Ownership, capital structure and financing decision: 
Evidence from the UK. The British Accounting Review, 48(4), 448-463. 
doi:10.1016/j.bar.2015.04.001 
